University of Florida Journal of Law & Public Policy
Volume 24

Issue 2

Article 5

2013

Sentencing and Punishment: The Missed Opportunity for a
Categorical Rule Against Life Without the Possibility of Parole for
Juveniles, Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012)
Kevin Miller

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/jlpp

Recommended Citation
Miller, Kevin (2013) "Sentencing and Punishment: The Missed Opportunity for a Categorical Rule Against
Life Without the Possibility of Parole for Juveniles, Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012)," University of
Florida Journal of Law & Public Policy: Vol. 24: Iss. 2, Article 5.
Available at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/jlpp/vol24/iss2/5

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by UF Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in University of Florida Journal of Law & Public Policy by an authorized editor of UF Law Scholarship
Repository. For more information, please contact kaleita@law.ufl.edu.

CASE COMMENT
SENTENCING AND PUNISHMENT: THE MISSED
OPPORTUNITY FOR A CATEGORICAL RULE AGAINST LIFE
WITHOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF PAROLE FOR JUVENILES
MILLER v. ALABAMA, 132 S. CT. 2455 (2012)
Kevin Miller

Two 14-year-olds were sentenced to life imprisonment without the
possibility of parole for the crime of murder under mandatory
sentencing statutes in a consolidated hearing of two cases before the
U.S. Supreme Court.' In the first case, the defendant was found guilty
of felony murder for participating in a robbery in which the clerk was
killed by another participant. 2 The Arkansas Supreme Court dismissed
the defendant's petition for habeas corpus. 3 In the second case, an
Alabama boy bludgeoned a neiphbor and then participated in his death
by arson during the cover-up. He was charged with murder in the
course of arson, which carries a mandatory minimum sentence of life
without parole. The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed that
the sentence was not excessive under the Eighth Amendment, and the
Alabama Supreme Court denied review.6 The U.S. Supreme Court
granted certiorari in both cases and HELD that a sentencing scheme
mandating life in prison without the possibility of parole for juvenile
offenders is impermissible under the Eighth Amendment.8
The Eighth Amendment prohibits "cruel and unusual punishments."
Inherent in this prohibition is the notion that defendants must have
committed a crime which is proportional to the sentence of death or life
imprisonment.9 Courts seeking to conduct a review of proportionality
* Kevin Miller is a third-year law student at the University of Florida Levin College of
Law, where he is a member of the University of FloridaJournal of Law and Public Policy,
member of the Bennett Inn of Court, JLPP Summer 2012 Note Winner, and 2012 Huber C.
Hurst Award Winner for this Comment. Prior to attending law school, he worked for several
technology companies, including Microsoft, and he founded his own software company.
1. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012).
2. Id. at 2457.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id. Both cases were transferred from juvenile to adult court at the request of their
respective District Attorneys.
6. Id. at 2463.
7. Id. at 2460.
8. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
9. See Capital Punishment, 40 GEO. L.J. ANN. REv. CRIM. PRoc. 817, 817 (2011)
(discussing the principle of proportionality).
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first analyze the punishment in light of societal mores and values and
then, in capital cases, independently review both the individual
circumstances of the crime and the background and personal
characteristics of the defendant.10 Since 1988, the U.S. Supreme Court
has utilized this method to progressively restrict states' rights to punish
juvenile offenders with the same severity as adults.
The opening salvo occurred in Thompson v. Oklahoma in 1988. The
Court established that there was a clear age-sixteen years-below
which a juvenile could not receive the death penalty." Thompson, aged
fifteen, assisted three adults in the brutal murder of his former brotherin-law.' 2 He was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to
death.13 The Court overturned the conviction. It justified this holding by
utilizing the framework of proportionality review to pursue several lines
of argument.14 First, eighteen states have set the minimum age for the
death penalty at sixteen.' 5 Second, juries have only sentenced 18-20
youths under the age of sixteen to death since 1900.1 Finally, American
society has long held that a child is less blameworthy than an adult
because a child is less able to evaluate the consequences of his
conduct.' 7 Thus, the Court delineated a categorical rule that no youth
under sixteen can be executed for his or her crimes.
Applying the logic of Thompson, the Court in Roper v. Simmons
extended its proscription of the death penalty to age eighteen." The
Court again conducted a proportionality review and found that the clear
direction of national consensus was toward abolishing the death penalty
for minors. 19 Further, it found that because of the neurological and
character differences between adolescents and adults, juveniles could
not be classed "among the worst offenders" 20 and thus penological
theory could not support the application of the death penalty to youths.2'
The Court thereby drew a clear line, restricting society's use of its most
severe penalty to those over age eighteen.
In Graham v. Florida, the Court considered whether society's
second-most severe penalty-life imprisonment without the possibility
of parole-could be applied to youthful offenders who commit a non10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

See id. at 817-19.
Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988) (plurality opinion).
Id. at 819.
Id.
Id. at 822.
Id. at 829.
Id. at 832.
Id. at 835.
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
See id. at 566-67.
Id. at 570.
Id. at 571.
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homicide crime.22 Graham was sentenced to the maximum penalty for
armed burglary-a life sentence.2 3 The U.S. Supreme Court reversed.2 4
Essentially, the Court again extended the logic of the death penalty ban
in Roper, applying the national consensus test for the first time to a
term-of-years sentence involving a minor. 25 The Court found that of the
129 juvenile offenders serving these sentences, 77 were in Florida, and
the remaining 52 were imprisoned in only ten states.26 These numbers
show that there is a clear national consensus against life without parole
for youths in non-homicide cases. 27 The Court further noted that the
mere existence of juvenile-to-adult court transfer systems (with or
without minimum age limits) does not indicate a positive legislative
decision to support the use of this adult penalty on juveniles.2 8
The Graham Court also reasserted its ultimate responsibility in
interpreting the Eighth Amendment, regardless of the outcome of the
national consensus analysis, to ensure that the offender's punishment is
proportional to the crime. 29 A life without parole sentence is especially
harsh on juveniles, who spend a proportionally larger amount of their
lives in prison; it also deprives them of the opportunity to mature. 30
Moreover, the Court found that life without parole lacks a penological
justification for juveniles either as retribution, deterrence,
incapacitation, or rehabilitation. 3 1 From a justification analysis, the
Court held this particular punishment to be inappropriate for the entire
class of juvenile offenders who had committed non-homicide crimes. 32
The Court did not extend the ban to juveniles with homicide or felony
murder convictions.
In the instant case, a majority U.S. Supreme Court broadened its
prohibition further still: mandatory life without parole sentences can no
longer be levied against juvenile offenders with homicide or felony
murder convictions. 33 In restricting its decision to mandatory life
without parole sentences, the Court again stopped short of a categorical
22. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010).
23. Id. at 48-49. The trial judge disregarded the 30-year sentence requested by the
prosecution as well as the statutory minimum of 5 years and imposed the maximum sentence on
his own discretion. Florida has abolished its parole system, so a life sentence is, in essence, life
without the possibility of parole.
24. Id. at 48.
25. Id. at 61.
26. Id. at 64.
27. Id. at 66.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 67-68.
30. See id. at 70.
31. See id. at 71.
32. Id. at 72.
33. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2457-58 (2012).
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ban on the entire class of such sentences. 3 4 However, the Court reasoned
that mandatory sentencing schemes removed the necessary element of
discretion which was required for prosecutors and sentencers to be
acting properly under the Eighth Amendment. 35 In short, proportionality
jurisprudence dictates that age be considered as a factor during
sentencing in crimes involving juveniles.3 6
The Court relied on the strength of its decisions in Roper and
Graham to attack mandatory life sentences on two grounds. 37 First, the
severity of the penalty is disproportionate to the class of juvenile
offenders, whom society acknowledges are less culpable. 38 Minors are
less mature, more susceptible to outside influences, and less fixed in
their character. 39 These traits mean that minors are simultaneously less
worthy of punishment and more capable of rehabilitation. 40 Hence,
society's second-most severe punishment may not be justified in all
cases.
The instant court's second step is more subtle: it likens a life without
parole sentence for juveniles to the death penalty.41 Youths will spend a
greater portion of their lives in prison and have no impetus for
42
rehabilitation. As a result, such sentences must not be mandatory
because they require the same kind of individual analysis of the
defendant's personal characteristics and the severity of his crime that
any capital punishment sentence would require.4 3 The Court concluded,
"[b]y making youth (and all that accompanies it) irrelevant to
imposition of that harshest prison sentence, such a scheme poses too
great a risk of disproportionate punishment."4 4
Contrary to the expectations of some commentators,4 5 the instant
Court opted not to agree with the Petitioners' argument that the Eighth
Amendment categorically bars life without parole sentences for minors
fourteen and younger. It chose instead to focus only on the secondary
34. Id. at 2459.
35. Id. at 2474-75.
36. Id. at 2469.
37. Id. at 2463.
38. Id. at 2464.
39. Id. (citing Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569-70 (2005)).
40. Id. at 2455, 2465.
41. Id. at 2466.
42. Id. at 2465.
43. Id. at 2467.
44. Id. at 2469.
45. See, e.g., Kathryn McEvilly, Comment, Crying Mercy: Life Without Parole for
Fourteen-Year-Old Offenders in Miller v. Alabama and Jackson v. Hobbs, 7 DuKE J. CONST. L.
& PUB. POL'Y SIDEBAR 231, 248-49 (2012) (arguing that "the Court will likely create a new
categorical prohibition on sentencing fourteen-year-old offenders to life without the possibility
of parole.").
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argument that mandatory life without parole violates the juvenile's
constitutional right to an individualized sentence.4 6 In doing so, the
Court missed an opportunity to provide needed clarity and consistency
to its jurisprudence concerning juvenile offenders. Below a threshold
age of eighteen, proscribing even discretionary life without parole
sentences for juveniles is well-supported by the Court's prior decisions
in Thompson, Roper, and Graham. The basic arguments which sustain
the categorical ban on non-homicide life without parole sentences
equally bolster a categorical ban in homicide cases.
First among these arguments is that the juvenile brain is structurally
different from the adult brain. A juvenile, while cognitively equivalent
to an adult in reasoning by age sixteen, shows markedly lower capacity
for sound decision-making under stressful conditions.4 7 This proposition
is widely accepted by both case history and neuroscience. 4 These
differences make a juvenile more likely to take rash action based on gut
instinct because he inaccurately assesses risk or perceives unwarranted
threats.4 9 These differences also make a juvenile more "susceptible to
negative influences," including peer pressure.o Furthermore,
incomplete development of the brain in juveniles makes their character
more malleable, making them less able to draw upon an ingrained moral
code than an adult.5 1 Indeed, some researchers have gone so far as to
suggest that science supports the adoption of a "reasonable adolescent"
standard to demarcate a juvenile from the common legal notion of the
"reasonable man." 52
In any event, considering these known differences between juveniles
and adults, there is little rational basis in Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence for distinguishing between mandatory and discretionary
sentencing in cases of juvenile homicide, felony murder, and nonhomicide crimes. A juvenile offender's original judgment and
culpability are not necessarily increased or diminished by the eventual
outcome of his crime. An armed robbery resulting in no deaths is not
thereby elevated to a higher plane of decision-making by its fortunate
46. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2455-69 ("Because that holding is sufficient to decide these
cases, we do not consider Jackson's and Miller's alternative argument that the Eighth
Amendment requires a categorical bar on life without parole for juveniles, or at least for those
14 years old and younger.").
47. See Jay D. Aronson, Neuroscience andJuvenile Justice, 42 AKRON L. REv. 917, 92122 (2009).
48. See id.; see also Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005).
49. See Aronson, supra note 47, at 923.
50. Roper, 543 U.S. at 569.
51. See id.
52. See Aronson, supra note 47, at 921 (citing Simmie Baer, Teleconference at the
American Bar Association Center for Continuing Legal Education: Roper v. Simmons: How
Will this Case Change Practice in the Courtroom? (June 22, 2005)).
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result. None of the key differences outlined above differ qualitatively
because of the severity of the crime. In fact, the Roper Court concluded,
"the same reasoning applies to all juvenile offenders under 18.""
The second broad argument is that mandatory sentencing of youths
to life without parole lacks penological justification, which means that it
is by definition "disproportionate to the offense." 54 None of the
penological goals of retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, or
rehabilitation are served by a life without parole sentence.ss The
community's desire to condemn a heinous crime must be tempered b
the existence of a direct relationship between fault and the sentence.
These criteria for retribution are not met, since differences in the
juvenile brain lessen the culpability which justifies the sentence.
Moreover, the goal of deterrence is not served because a youth's
lessened ability for rational judgment under stress makes him or her less
likely to consider the eventual outcome of his or her crime.58 Hence, a
severe punishment has less of a deterrent effect on a youth than on an
adult.
Neither is incapacitation supported. The transient nature of a youth's
character makes it difficult for sentencers to judge whether he will
commit further crimes or reform. 60 Finally, the goal of rehabilitation
obviously cannot be served in the context of a sentencing method which
deprives the offender of any possible motivation to reform: it
"forswears altogether the rehabilitative ideal." 6 1 Thus, the argument that
mandatory life sentences lack penological justification applies equally,
and without modification, to discretionary life sentences.
In light of these factors, to allow even discretionary, case-by-case
sentencing of juveniles to life without parole is problematic for reasons
the Court took pains to delineate in Graham.62 Even if a few offenders
might have the maturity to deserve the severest sentence, courts would
still have difficulty differentiating those few from the majority who
have the faculty and the desire to reform. 63 Further, it would be difficult
for prosecutors, judges, and juries to overcome their shock and outrage
at a heinous crime for a non-specific "consider the accused's age"

53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

Roper, 543 U.S. at 571.
Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 71 (2010).
See id. at 2028-30.
Id. at 2028.
See supra text accompanying notes 45, 52.
Graham, 560 U.S. at 72-73.
Id. at 72.
See id.
Id. at 74.
See id. at 76-80.
Id. at 78.
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directive.64 Finally, juveniles are more prejudiced by the criminal justice
system than adults because they are less able to relate to their attorneys
and to participate effectively in their own defense. 65 If these factors are
valid concerns for non-homicide juvenile offenses, they are not made
less so because the offense led to homicide. Therefore, the logic
Graham used to conclude that a categorical rule was necessary for nonhomicide offenses similarly justifies the necessity for a categorical rule
for all homicide offenses.
The instant Court acknowledges what lurks in its choice not to set a
categorical rule when expressing its hope that "appropriate occasions
for sentencinf juveniles to this harshest possible penalty will be
uncommon."6 However, for evidence of the likelihood of misuse of a
discretionary rule, the Court needs to look no further than the seminal
cases it has decided in juvenile sentencing. In Graham, the trial judge
chose to overrule the recommendations of the prosecutor in levying life
without parole for a non-homicide crime. 67 In the instant case, both
District Attorneys used their discretion to transfer the cases to adult
court, with full foresight of the eventual outcome if the defendants were
convicted.6 8 In the Court's own words, "[a] categorical rule avoids the
risk that . . . a court or jury will erroneously conclude that a particular
juvenile is sufficiently culpable to deserve life without parole. . . ."69
While achieving a laudable interim goal, the U.S. Supreme Court's
holding in the instant case does not go far enough. Some fixed
boundaries are required: a categorical rule barring all sentences of life
without parole, both discretionary and mandatory, for minors would
accomplish this goal. It is possible that, as the approximately 2500
prisoners currently receiving life without parole for crimes committed
as minors70 begin to file their appeals, the Court will further clarify the
law in this area. However, it was well within the Court's power to have
done so here, within the framework of existing precedent.

64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 573 (2005).
Graham, 560 U.S. at 78.
Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2469 (2012).
Graham, 560 U.S. at 57-58.
Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2461; see also id. at 2463.
Graham, 560 U.S. at 51.
Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2477 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
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